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BOOKSETAL.
conclusion, “it is not too much to suggest that
as the styles of thinking in biology mutate, so
then should the styles of thought in those dis-
ciplines seeking to understand their social
organization and consequences. The critical
social sciences also need to understand that
the most profound thought is that which
remains on the surface.” Even as Rose’s book
offers tremendous insight into our biomedical
present, it may be that some of those tradi-
tional analyses have something yet to con-
tribute as we confront the unfolding inequities
of contemporary vital politics.
10.1126/science.1144402
PSYCHOLOGY
The Nature of Belief
Scott Atran
In explaining why he wrote Six ImpossibleThings Before Breakfast, Lewis Wolpertdescribes a disturbing encounter with his
son’s envious belief that father has the advan-
tage in life because he is likely to die sooner
and enjoy heaven. In August 2005, while with
Muslim mujahedin in Sulawesi, I noticed tears
welling up in my traveling companion, Farkhin
(who helped bomb the Philippine ambas-
sador’s residence in Jakarta and had hosted
9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed)
when he heard of a young man killed in a skir-
mish with Christian fighters. “Farkhin, you
knew the boy?” I asked. “No,” he lamented,
“but he was only in the Jihad a few weeks; I’ve
been fighting since Afghanistan [late 1980s]
and I’m still not a martyr.”
In trying to grasp his son’s belief as well as
the beliefs of people like suicide bombers and
today’s great clashes among religious and polit-
ical beliefs, Wolpert draws fresh insight from
the biological and evolutionary roots of belief.
He surveys a vast domain that begins with chil-
dren’s innate ideas about the differences
between how inert objects and animate agents
like people interact and ends with the almost
miraculous breakaway of scientific beliefs
from our intuitive understanding of the world:
there are more molecules in a glass of water
than glasses of water in the oceans. We find out
that other primates lack mental equipment for
mind reading. They can’t represent or embed
another’s beliefs in their own thoughts (“John
believes that Mary thinks that…”). Thus they
can’t understand how they or others can have
false beliefs or conceive of fiction, God, or sci-
entific truth. And we learn why other animals
can’t truly imitate or learn a new dance and why
homeopathic medicine and psychotherapy
involve “beliefs related to witchcraft.” 
The book’s unifying theme is that all belief
is ultimately rooted in causal understanding
and has its evolutionary origins in the use and
manufacture of tools. This lets Wolpert scan the
landscape of belief with clarity and direction
but leads down the wrong path in key areas. He
argues that managing fire “might have been
one of the origins of market exchange, and
might have led to the advantage of humans
knowing about numbers.” Yet defining aspects
of number, such as the concept of a class of
similar classes or of infinite discreteness, relate
more to categorization processes and language
structure than to causality. We
are told  “Verbs ranging from
‘go’ to ‘hit’ to ‘throw’ require
causal thinking … an essential
prerequisite for language devel-
opment.” Now Kanzi, a brilliant
bonobo, can use symbolic
tokens to reference causal rela-
tions between actions and
goals; however, Kanzi’s strings
are usually action-action com-
binations, such as “chase bite.”
These strings employ two
“predicates” and no subject. No
human language allows sentences that have no
syntactic arguments and thus cannot express a
subject-predicate proposition. Hominid tool
play tells us little of testable, scientific interest
about linguistic structure, number, or markets.
But it is Wolpert’s speculation on religion
that is needlessly awry. He claims religious
beliefs “all had their origin in the evolution of
causal beliefs, which in turn had its origins in
tool use.” Gods and prayer act in tandem to
promote “optimism and hope” by providing
special controlling forces when common-
sense expectations fail, catastrophe or chaos
leaves life to chance, or death looms. “And
since causal beliefs that promote survival are
partly programmed by our genes, could that
not also be true of some aspects of religious
beliefs that promote survival, particularly
those that relate to mystical forces, and even,
perhaps to the gods themselves?” 
Wolpert identifies religion with belief in
the supernatural, which is fine by me, but
recent work in the cognitive science of reli-
gion indicates that there is no genetically priv-
ileged “supernatural imagination” or “biolog-
ically determined module for making myths.”
Rather, cognitive production of the supernatu-
ral occurs by purposely violating our ordinary
and innate ideas about causality. Wolpert
acknowledges that “what makes an event
magical is that it goes against our natural
expectations about causes,” just as dragons
and other monstrous hybrids violate innate
assumptions about essentialized biological
categories. But this is not because some
extraordinary, parallel faculty of causal rea-
soning evolved through genetic adaptation.
Religion involves the same causal cate-
gories that evolution endowed us with for
everyday thinking—including folk mechan-
ics (object boundaries and movements), folk
biology (species-like essences and relations),
and folk psychology (interactive agents and
goal-directed behavior)—and which con-
strain the ways children learn language. Core
religious beliefs minimally violate ordinary
notions about how the world is, with all of its
inescapable problems, thus
enabling cognitively manage-
able and memorable supernat-
ural worlds that treat existen-
tial problems, including death
and deception—for example, a
world with beings (angels,
ghosts, ancestral spirits) that
resemble us emotionally, intel-
lectually, and even physically
except they can move through
solid objects and be immortal. 
That “lower blood pres-
sure … has a positive associa-
tion with religious belief ” may be true in set-
tings most familiar to many of us, but it is
doubtful for more passionate contexts (e.g.,
pentecostal or jihadi). And although “one can
see how valuable the possible force of prayer
is to the more or less helpless individual
suffering from severe pain,” most prayer—
indeed, most religious ceremony—occurs in
ritualized social settings that coordinate the
congregation’s body states (chanting, sway-
ing, displays of submission, etc.) and that
arguably promote an emotional consensus
that can trump even the most logically com-
pelling and evidence-based beliefs. 
If religion is, as Wolpert suggests, a spe-
cial form of causal belief—immune to logic
and evidence—about how things are in the
world, then it is true that “science is basically
in conflict with religion.” But if religion is pri-
marily about what ought to be, including
moral framing that convinces people to com-
mit to others beyond the logic and evidence
for advancing self-interest, then conflict is not
inevitable. Understanding and manipulating
causality, though key to science, is only one
integral component of religion and other
aspects of human brain development, knowl-
edge, and belief that bind us to one another
and the world.
10.1126/science.1142653
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